On the Moral Status of AI Entities
(MPhil) PhD, Philosophy, 2025-29. King's College London
This site supports my PhD Research Project at King’s College, London.
My research project aims to provide an original contribution to the ethics of AI by showing that current, preferred theories of moral status theories may require us to grant a degree of moral regard to advanced AI systems of the near future. See more at Philosophy of AI.
I am presently completing the first year of the MPhil/PhD under the supervision of Dr. Adrian Alsmith and Prof. David Papineau. I am currently studying classic and contemporary work in Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Ethics.
Below are some of my recent papers on Ethics and AI.
Do capacities best explain moral status?
My 2025 dissertation argues that a capacities-based theory of moral status is superior to a suffering-based account, and is better suited to considering the moral status of AI entities. Contact me
What we might owe our robots
If we accept a physicalist account of the mind, and Kagan’s capacities argument for moral status, we may be committed to granting a degree of moral status to advanced AI entities of the near-future. March 2026. Read it here
The end of history and the last job
A short essay on the effect of AI on jobs. Feb 2026. Read it here